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1. Introduction 
Electricity traders sometimes make mistakes, and they know it. To reduce the expected cost of 
mistakes, risk-averse traders scale back their actions when the direction of trade that maximises 
profit is unclear. The benefits of interconnecting electricity markets are significantly reduced if 
capacity is under-used, and sometimes used in the wrong direction. The European Union’s Internal 
Electricity Market is designed to maximise the benefits of interconnection among member states. In 
particular, market coupling between 19 countries in North-Western Europe uses algorithms to 
ensure that as much electricity as possible is traded from lower- to higher-priced markets. This has 
brought significant welfare gains. The British electricity market is one of the 19, but may de-couple 
itself from the system as a possible consequence of Brexit – the UK’s decision to leave the EU. We 
wish to calculate the cost of this Elecxit. 
The European Union’s plan to create an internal electricity market started with the deregulation of 
national electricity markets in the 1990s.  The vision of a cross-border market design had been largely 
implemented by 2015 in the form of the Electricity Target Model (ETM)(ACER, 2015). In particular, 
market coupling implies that day-ahead wholesale markets clear simultaneously and transmission 
capacity is automatically allocated so that electricity can flow from low- to high-priced areas until 
prices are equalised or capacity is fully used. Trade between Member States is now only limited by 
capacity constraints of the infrastructure. To tackle this, the EU has set the goal to expand 
interconnector capacities to 10% of each national electricity generation capacity by 2020 and 15% by 
2030. 
Until recently, it seemed highly unlikely that the integration of Europe’s electricity industry would be 
reversed, but Great Britain is in the process of leaving the EU. The EU and Great Britain are currently 
negotiating the conditions of this exit and their future relationship. The outcome of the negotiations 
is currently (April 2019) highly unpredictable, given their breadth, depth and political circumstances. 
The complexity of the negotiation is evident in the electricity sector (Mathieu et al., 2018). In 
addition to the institutions of electricity trading or tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, any 
readjustment of the emissions trading system, Euratom regulation or the Renewable Energy 
Directive might have indirect consequences for the electricity sector. Again, the result is not 
foreseeable. Nevertheless, Brexit scenarios have been developed to help stakeholders prepare and 
to underpin their bargaining positions. Two significant design principles and conclusions from them 
are presented as examples: 
 A number of Brexit scenarios build on the GB Government's rejection of jurisdiction by the 
European Court of Justice. A UKERC/Chatham House Report1 suggests that the rejection of this 
institution excludes British actors from the institutions controlled by them, amongst others the 
single electricity market. In particular, GB electricity markets could not remain coupled with their 
continental counterparts. 
The resulting uncertainties about the profitability of trading and a reduction of EU funds could 
hinder the expansion of the trade infrastructure between GB and the continent (in the context 
                                                          
1 Froggatt et al. (2017), page 18: “Following the UK’s decision to leave the EU, it is still unclear whether UK will remain part of current and 
future market coupling arrangements. This is because these require the active collaboration of GB interconnection counterparts, and 
market coupling was mostly developed through European legislation (e.g. the European Network Codes on capacity allocation and 
congestion management (CACM), and on forward capacity allocation (FCA)).” 
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mentioned above) from 4 to 10 GW by 2021 (Froggatt et al., 2017), especially those currently in 
the planning phase. 
 The European Commission has published a scenario for the case that negotiations would not 
succeed by the date of withdrawal (DG ENER, 2018). Then, Great Britain would become a ‘third 
country’ and ‘EU rules in the field of energy market regulation will no longer apply to the United 
Kingdom’. As consequences of this, the Commission foresees not only market uncoupling, but 
also the necessity to charge an interconnector usage fee for trade with Great Britain. Whether 
the latter equals a tariff is not yet obvious.   
Alternatively, GB’s government has proposed that the country remains in a Customs Union for goods, 
and this approach – if accepted by the EU – might also cover the internal electricity market. In this 
context, where uncoupling may not be inevitable, it is useful to estimate the cost of de-coupling 
Great Britain from the internal electricity market, and of halting the expansion of interconnectors.  
For this purpose, the welfare losses are not simply the inverse of the welfare benefits previously 
gained from European market integration, projected one-to-one into the future. The electricity 
sector is changing too much for that approach to give realistic estimates. In particular: 
1. Before market coupling, trading decisions frequently proved to be uneconomic ex post, but their 
impacts were limited by small interconnector capacities. Interconnector capacity is rising 
substantially, and future mistakes would have greater opportunity costs than those prevented by 
market coupling in the past. 
2. The structure of electricity generation will change dramatically as more intermittent renewables 
will enter the market. A higher share of renewable generation will make international 
coordination more valuable and a lack of coordination costlier. 
3. Generation mixes will be adjusted to the higher share of intermittent renewable generation and 
a change in the load profile. These changes in national supply might also affect the sensitivity of 
the market price to traded electricity and thus alter the effect of reduced market coordination. 
We base our estimates on scenarios for 2030 to show the longer-term opportunity costs of Elecxit. 
Since an analysis of the costs of market decoupling in 2030 is likely to be unreliable if it is based only 
on past estimates of the benefits from market coupling, we create a structural model of trading in 
uncoupled markets that allows us to take account of the three changes above. We assume that the 
inefficiencies of decoupled markets are solely caused by uncertainties resulting from the separation 
of auctions of cross border transmission capacities and day-ahead markets. This explanation is 
supported by survey answers of market participants (European Commission, 2007, pp183-6), and is 
considered as most important by other authors, e.g. Newbery et al. (2016).  Perhaps most 
importantly, it enables simulations of trading patterns of decoupled markets in the past that fit well 
to observed data. 
Mahringer (2014) simulates inefficiencies in trading as due to imperfect anticipation of price 
dynamics, but uses a continuous stochastic process that is not easily adapted for the econometric 
estimates needed to calibrate our model. Instead, we present a simple but micro-founded two-
country trade model. 
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With market coupling, all markets for delivery at time X close at the same time C and trade can be 
optimised.2 If the markets are uncoupled, one of them (D) closes earlier than C. Traders then have to 
supply and to demand energy and to acquire transmission rights on sequentially closing markets. 
Trading economically therefore requires price expectations to be formed for the ‘not yet closed’ 
markets. As future demand and intermittent renewable generation are uncertain, prices are also 
uncertain and trade can only be adjusted optimally to an expected (average) scenario. This trading 
volume is however suboptimal in many ex post cases, causing welfare losses. In extreme cases the 
direction of trading can even be reversed by the anticipation error. We calibrated the model with 
generation, load and trading data for Great Britain and France in 2009, when their markets were 
uncoupled, allowing us to estimate the underlying anticipation error and a possible reduction of the 
optimal trading volume. We assume that the market design after the market decoupling corresponds 
to that used for calibration, so that the variance of this basic anticipation error does not change due 
to changes in the length of forecasting intervals. 
With the quantified model, our initial estimate of the benefits of market coupling in 2010 was 50% 
above values in the literature. This can be explained by the implicit assumption of the standard 
approach that the trading pattern on uncoupled markets is independent of market rules. While the 
standard assumption is that arbitrage traders are risk-neutral, our empirical results strongly suggest 
that traders in uncoupled markets are risk-averse, and that this discourages trade. This increases the 
gains from market coupling. 
Second, we simulate the costs (in 2030) of dis-integrating the British electricity market from France 
(representing Continental Europe), against the background of the ENTSO-E 2030 vision 3 scenario. 
Load profiles, generation capacities and costs are taken from this scenario, with wind and solar 
output profiles taken from Renewables.ninja (Pfenninger and Staffell, 2016). With significantly higher 
levels of wind and solar generation, we find that the same underlying anticipation error would lead 
to trading errors twice as large (in MW terms) as in 2009. 
We compare a business-as-usual reference case, “Soft Elecxit”, with continued market coupling and 
an increase to 10 GW of interconnector capacity with a “Hard Elecxit”, where the British and French 
markets are decoupled and interconnector capacity only rises marginally to 5 GW. This raises the cost 
of generation in both countries by €560m or 1.5% of the market value, compared to the reference 
case. We find that most of these costs are due to market decoupling, as the net benefits of adding 
interconnector capacity are low if this simply allows traders between decoupled markets to make 
greater mistakes. Among the costs of market decoupling, the reduction of trading volumes due to 
risk aversion is more important than trading errors based on imperfect information. 
Following this introduction, the second section presents an overview of the effects of decoupled 
electricity markets and discusses their causes. On this basis, Section 3 sets out a model of rational 
trade in decoupled electricity markets. The model developed is then applied in section 4. First it is 
conditioned for empirical treatment in section 4.1 and econometrically estimated for 2009 data in 
4.2. The quantified model is used to estimate the benefits of market coupling in 2009 ex post. In 
section 4.3 Elecxit scenarios between GB and France in 2030 are simulated and welfare effects 
estimated. Finally, in section 5 conclusions are drawn. 
                                                          
2 Even though there is residual load uncertainty between C and the time of delivery X we are only interested in additional uncertainties of 
market closure prior to C. 
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2. What is wrong with uncoupled electricity markets? 
In general, two markets can be defined as uncoupled if market rules exclude a conditioning of supply 
and demand in each of the markets on the price of the other market. This might be caused by 
different market closure times, by the necessity to submit unconditional demand or supply prices to 
the auctioneer or it might simply be forbidden to receive the relevant information. While in general 
this lack of information reduces allocative efficiency, it should be pointed out that market coupling 
increases transactions costs, in particular those of communications infrastructure,3 and it 
complicates the search for an integrated market equilibrium. Whether markets should be coupled or 
not is thus a quantitative question of costs and benefits. In electricity market equilibrium, 
arbitrageurs in coupled markets fully equilibrate competitive prices, as far as allowed by transmission 
capacity constraints.4 This maximises short-run welfare, and should be compared with the outcome 
when markets are not coupled. 
2.1. Uncoupled Markets  
While adjoining electricity control areas typically exchanged power, the early wholesale markets 
were uncoupled. To trade power between two adjacent markets, a company would need to reserve 
transmission capacity on the interconnector between them, buy power in one market, and sell it in 
the other. Much transmission capacity was sold in advance in long-duration blocks, and the quantity 
available in each direction was limited to the maximum capacity of the interconnector. There was 
often no mechanism for releasing additional capacity to the market if the holder did not want to use 
their rights, or if electricity flowing in the other direction created spare capacity on the lines (easily 
possible in an AC network). 
If one market publishes its results before the deadline for submitting bids to the other,5 traders 
would at least know whether they now have to buy or sell power in the second market, or if they 
came away from the first auction with nothing. However, the time difference between the two 
markets’ deadlines means that new information on demand and generators’ availability, and hence 
on expected prices, is likely to arrive after the first set of bids are submitted. The trader may now be 
committed to selling power into a market newly expected to have a surplus, and therefore face a 
loss.  
But even if the market deadlines are identical, so that all bids will be based on the same information 
set, individual traders will only know part of it, and so the only way to be sure of not having un-
matched commitments is to submit one unconditional bid to buy and one unconditional offer to sell. 
This ensures trade, whatever the price combination on the two markets. When price differences are 
large and systematic, this strategy may be consistently successful, but if the two markets have similar 
prices, a trader who is unlucky in the individual information will commit to a trade that turns out to 
be unprofitable. It is unlikely that arbitrageurs could gather all the information needed to prevent 
this. 
                                                          
3 NAO (2003) estimates the additional infrastructure cost for the ‘new electricity trading arrangements (NETA)’ in England and Wales at 
£116 million for the first 5 years and £30 million per year thereafter. 
4 The algorithm for determining local market prices under Euphemia contains the optimal trading strategy of an arbitrageur. To further 
investigate this strategy, we explicitly introduce this actor, although under Euphemia there is no longer any physical counterpart. 
5 A detailed description of market rules can be found in Madlener and Kaufmann (2002). 
6 
2.2. Coupled markets 
If the markets are coupled, the system operators take over the role of cross-border traders. The 
markets close at the same time, so all bids and offers are drawn from the same information set. 
Computer algorithms move power from a lower- to a higher-priced market until the prices are 
equalised or interconnector capacity is fully used. All generators and buyers face the price in their 
local market, and the difference between those prices creates revenue for the interconnector 
owners. Since all market participants’ information is used to derive all prices, this should increase 
market efficiency, although market coupling also increases transactions costs. 
However, equilibrating prices is not possible if the capacity limit of the transmission infrastructure is 
reached: i.e. either prices in both markets are the same and the trade volume is below capacity or 
prices are not equal and there is no unused capacity available. This “ideal trading” pattern takes the 
form of a step function in terms of price differences and utilisation of the trading capacity (the red 
curve in Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: GB France trading pattern – before market coupling: hourly capacity 
utilization of the France GB interconnector vs. hourly price differentials on the day 
ahead markets in 2009. Grey shaded areas indicate trading against the price 
differential. Sources of all market data are given in table 3. 
However, in uncoupled markets (e.g. between France and GB in 2009), frequent and strong 
deviations from this ideal trading pattern are found (blue dots, Figure 1). Price differentials persisted 
for a large number of trading periods without binding capacity restriction. It is clear that the trading 
potential was often not used efficiently. In 30% of periods, electricity was bought in the market with 
higher prices and sold on the market with the lower prices. At these times, simply not trading would 
have been welfare-enhancing. Ehrenmann and Smeers (2004) and Bunn and Zachmann (2010) 
discussed possible reasons for the under-utilisation of interconnector capacity: 
1. Uncertainties from the separation of transmission and energy markets. Transmission auctions 
usually preceded the energy markets,  
2. System operators may have need to be active in scheduling cross-border flows for congestion 
and system balancing purposes and 
3. Strategic trading by generators with market power (generators would trade against the price 
differential, selling into a cheaper market to raise demand and price in their home market). 
The impact of uncertainties caused by separating the allocation of transmission capacity and local 
electricity markets are well documented. To quote the European Commission’s Energy Sector Inquiry 
(2007, p. 184), “the deadline for interconnector nominations occurs after the French (Powernext) 
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energy market clears, while the UKPX (the leading GB power exchange) is open and prior to gate 
closure6 in respect of GB’s balancing mechanism.” Under these market rules market participants 
confirmed in a poll “that they faced uncertainty since they had to place auction bids based on 
expected wholesale market prices.” (p. 185) 
Market coupling would remove uncertainties due to separated markets, and make trading against 
the price differential impossible. Therefore, the past welfare losses of uncoupled markets (and short-
term welfare gains from market coupling) could simply be estimated by comparing the observed 
trade pattern to the ideal pattern and evaluating the differences.  
In the simplest form applied by ACER (2013), interconnector utilisation was artificially increased to 
100% at existing price differences, while the advanced version (Newbery et al, 2016) also took 
account of price convergence due to higher utilisation. The uncoupled and ideal allocations could 
then be compared by welfare measures based on local supply and demand. ‘Before and after’ 
estimates of day-ahead market prices quantify a price drop that induces a welfare gain of 0.25-0.5% 
of the wholesale market value (Newbery et al., 2016). Further estimates are summarised in table 1. It 
is implicitly assumed that the willingness to trade is independent of market coupling, an assumption 
challenged by our estimates in section 4.2. 
System wide estimates   
Newbery et al. (2016) Considering price changes  Day-ahead market coupling 0.25–0.5% 
wholesale value day ahead 
 Intra-day and balancing benefits 
€1.3bn/yr. 
 Total benefits including removing 
unscheduled flows could be €3.4bn/yr 
Mansur and White (2009) Compare prices before and after a bilaterally cleared 
zone joined PJM's market area to estimate price 
spreads and welfare gains 
0.7% wholesale value  
Single interconnectors 
  
Meeus (2011) Compare flows and determine welfare gains on the 
Denmark-Germany Kontek cable with no coupling and 
one-way market coupling. 
Welfare gain €10m/yr or €17m/GWyr, >> 
Mansur and White (2009) estimates 
SEM Committee (2011) Estimate welfare gains of coupling the interconnectors 
between GB and the Single Electricity Market (SEM) of 
Ireland (950/910 MW imports/580 MW exports) 
€30m/yr for import capacity of 930 MW, 
€32m/GWyr, >> Meeus (2011) estimates 
National Grid (2015) Sharing reserves over interconnectors might reduce 
capacity needs by 2.8 GW 
With 2014 capacity auction price of 
19.40/kWyr: €15m/GWyr = Meeus (2011) 
estimates. 
Table 1: Overview of estimates of market integration benefits. 
These estimates have motivated regulators to gradually couple European electricity markets, until all 
the markets of north-west Europe with 19 countries and 85% of the European power consumption 
were coupled by 2015 (epexspot.com, market coupling; Table 2). 
  
                                                          
6 Gate closure is the point at which trading must cease, except for balancing trades with the system operator as counter-party (Madlener 
and Kaufmann, 2002). 
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1996 Nordpool: 
Norway Sweden 
       
1998 + Finland        
2000 + Denmark        
2006 Tri-Lateral 
Market 
Coupling TLC: 
France, 
Belgium, 
Netherlands, 
(Luxemburg) 
      
2007 MIBEL 
Spain 
Portugal 
     
2010 Central West Europe (CWE) Germany 
Austria 
Poland, Latvia, 
Lithuania 
Estonia 
   
2011 + GB   
2014 North Western Europe (NWE)  4M (CEE): Hungary, 
Romania, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia 
2015 + Italy 
Slovenia 
Table 2: Stepwise integration of European electricity markets.  
Indeed, the trading pattern for the implicitly auctioned net daily inter-connector capacity on the 
France-GB border and the hourly price differential between UKPX and EPEX in 2017 (Figure 2) closely 
fits the ideal trading pattern. As described above, either the prices are practically equilibrated7 or the 
capacity restriction binds. 
 
Figure 2: GB France trading pattern – under coupled markets: hourly capacity 
utilisation of the France GB interconnector vs. hourly price differentials on the day- 
ahead markets in 2017. 
As market coupling resolved almost all possible reasons for inefficiencies and transformed the 
observable allocation from distorted to ideal, it was not necessary to evaluate the actual sources of 
inefficiency when estimating the gains from coupling. We cannot simply take the reverse of these 
gains as an estimate of the cost of market uncoupling from Elecxit, as the conditions will differ 
strongly in a future sustainable electricity system with higher shares of renewables, higher 
transmission capacities and adjusted generation structures. To improve accuracy, it is necessary to 
model the counterfactual of decoupled markets. This is different in principle to the modelling of 
market coupling as the ideal allocation is the ‘business as usual’ and the distorted inefficient 
allocation must be constructed actively. Therefore, the reason for the inefficiencies of uncoupled 
                                                          
7 There are small fees to cover the electricity lost on the DC interconnector and at the AC-DC conversion stations, and so a small price 
difference is needed to cover these and make trading worthwhile – the EU market allocation algorithm takes account of this, as shown in 
Figure 2. 
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markets must be made explicit. We interpret the wide geographical extent of trading inefficiencies 
when explicit interconnector capacity auctions close before at least one electricity market as 
evidence that uncertainty is the most important cause of inefficiency, and focus our analysis on this. 
 
Data 2009 2017 
Day ahead prices GB APX APX 
Day ahead auction prices F EPEX France EPEX France 
Trade F-GB RTE RTE 
Interconnector Capacity RTE N2EX Market Coupling Capacities 
Load GB Elexon / National Grid Elexon / National Grid 
Load F RTE RTE 
Table 3: Data sources used in this study. Réseau de transport d'électricité (RTE) is the French 
transmission system operator. 
3. Trade equilibrium in uncoupled markets 
We develop a model of profit-maximising bilateral trade between France (F) and Great Britain (G) in 
uncoupled day-ahead markets with trading losses and capacity constraints. First, a trading 
equilibrium in coupled markets is defined (3.1). Then in (3.2) we study its structural properties 
graphically and based on these an algorithm for its computation is derived. We then introduce 
uncoupled markets (3.3) with anticipation errors and show how to modify the previous analysis. 
The trading volume 𝑇𝑇ℎ is defined as the net energy imported into GB (for 𝑇𝑇ℎ > 0); exports from GB 
are shown as negative values of Th. Due to losses (equal to a proportion τ of the traded electricity) 
France would have to export 𝑇𝑇ℎ/(1 − 𝜏𝜏) units of energy in order to deliver 𝑇𝑇ℎ in GB.  If GB Is 
exporting Th units of electricity, then (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝑇𝑇ℎ units of energy can be sold in France. If we define 
transmission capacity symmetrically �𝐾𝐾ℎ = 𝐾𝐾ℎ� in terms of the energy entering the exporting 
conversion station (that is, before losses), GB imports are restricted to no more than (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐾𝐾ℎ and 
exports to no more than 𝐾𝐾ℎ. The function 𝜑𝜑(𝑇𝑇) = (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑇𝑇) simplifies the notation significantly. 
3.1. Trading equilibrium with losses 
We first describe an equilibrium model of optimal bilateral trade in uncoupled day-ahead markets. 
To keep things simple, we do not consider the allocation of interconnector capacity among traders 
but assume the existence of a representative price-taking trader (arbitrageur). A trading equilibrium 
is a vector of French and British prices and a trading volume �𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,ℎ∗ ,𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺,ℎ∗ ,𝑇𝑇ℎ∗� in every hour ℎ such that: 
1. The price-taking arbitrageur maximises its profits and 2. Given the prices, the induced supply and 
trade equal local load. 
Demand in each market is given by 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺,ℎ and 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹,ℎ, known in advance and unaffected by price. All 
markets are perfectly competitive thus marginal costs of generation equal market prices. Market 
supply can be described by 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺,ℎ′ −1(𝐿𝐿) and 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹,ℎ′ −1(𝐿𝐿), the inverses of the aggregated marginal cost 
functions 𝐶𝐶′(𝐿𝐿). The underlying cost functions 𝐶𝐶 are assumed to be monotonous and at least twice 
differentiable. To cover seasonality of the supply,8 𝐶𝐶′ depends on ℎ. In our estimation and 
simulations, we use 8 half-seasons. 
                                                          
8 Maintenance is concentrated in the summer months. Ofgem, 2012 (page 27, figure 3.1) reports that coal fired power plants are 26% 
more available in winter than in summer - respectively gas CCGT (+17%), OCGT (+14%) and nuclear (+12%). Gas prices are also seasonal. 
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Furthermore, we assume that there is short term information 𝜀𝜀𝐺𝐺,ℎ and 𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹,ℎ known to all market 
participants that shifts the supply curve. These supply curve residuals are distributed normally with 
standard deviation 𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺 and 𝜎𝜎𝐹𝐹. Market clearing on the two markets implies 
𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺,ℎ′ −1�𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺,ℎ − 𝜀𝜀𝐺𝐺,ℎ� = 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺,ℎ − 𝑇𝑇ℎ (1) 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹,ℎ′ −1�𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,ℎ − 𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹,ℎ� = 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹,ℎ + 𝜑𝜑(𝑇𝑇ℎ)𝑇𝑇ℎ (2) 
The calculus of the profit maximising, representative, price-taking arbitrage trader that shifts 𝑇𝑇 
British units of energy from France to Great Britain restricted by a transmission capacity 𝐾𝐾 is max𝑇𝑇 𝜋𝜋ℎ𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = �𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺,ℎ − 𝜑𝜑(𝑇𝑇)𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,ℎ�𝑇𝑇 
𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡. : −𝐾𝐾ℎ ≤ 𝑇𝑇 ≤ (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐾𝐾ℎ (3) 
The optimal trade is a set-valued mapping from the prices 𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺,ℎ,𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,ℎ to the admissible trade levels 
𝑇𝑇∗�𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺,ℎ,𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,ℎ� =
⎩
⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
⎧ (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐾𝐾ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺,ℎ > 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,ℎ(1 − 𝜏𝜏)−1
�(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐾𝐾ℎ , 0� 𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺,ℎ = 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,ℎ(1 − 𝜏𝜏)−10 (1 − 𝜏𝜏)+1 < 𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺,ℎ/𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,ℎ < (1 − 𝜏𝜏)−1
�−𝐾𝐾ℎ, 0� 𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺,ℎ = 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,ℎ(1 − 𝜏𝜏)+1
−𝐾𝐾ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺,ℎ < 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,ℎ(1 − 𝜏𝜏)+1
 (4) 
3.2. Equilibrium analysis 
The structure of the equilibrium can be analysed graphically using the price relation 𝑝𝑝ℎ = 𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺,ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,ℎ⁄ . 
With this definition (4) can be simplified to the trade demand (set-valued mapping) 𝑇𝑇∗(𝑝𝑝ℎ). A trade 
supply can be derived by inverting market balancing conditions (1) and (2) for the local prices 
𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺,ℎ(𝑇𝑇) = 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺,ℎ′ �𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺,ℎ − 𝑇𝑇� + 𝜀𝜀𝐺𝐺,ℎ (5) 
𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,ℎ(𝑇𝑇) = 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹,ℎ′ �𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹,ℎ + 𝜑𝜑(𝑇𝑇)𝑇𝑇� + 𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹,ℎ (6) 
and plugging (5) and (6) into the definition of 𝑝𝑝ℎ. The trade supply derived from (5) and (6) and the 
optimal set (derived from 4) are shown in Figure 4. It is straightforward to see that there exists 
exactly one equilibrium and that it can be determined with an algorithm to check which section of 
the demand has an intersection with the supply:9 Check whether there is a no-trade-equilibrium. If 
not, determine the trading volume that equilibrates marginal costs (net of trading losses). If this 
volume is within capacity constraints then it is the trading equilibrium. If not, the binding capacity is 
the equilibrium trading level. 
                                                          
9 As unique intersections of a step curve and a monotonic line have to be identified a case distinction is required. The order of the cases can 
be chosen freely. Our chosen order gives a formalism that is suitable for a common econometric treatment. We could equally well reverse 
the second and third steps to reduce the number of computationally demanding solutions of an implicit equation. 
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Figure 4: The structure of the trade equilibrium induced by trade demand and 
trade supply. Note that 𝑝𝑝ℎ is a price relation and thus supply and demand are 
graphical representations but not conventional demand or supply. 
This algorithm can be expressed more formally with the unconstrained latent equilibrium trade 
volume 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿, which would equalise prices (net of losses) in the absence of capacity constraints, 
implicitly defined as: 
0 = 𝐹𝐹�𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿� ≔ �𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝�𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿 ,−1� 𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝(0,−1) > 0𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝(0, +1) < 0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝(0,−1)
𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝�𝑇𝑇ℎ
𝐿𝐿 , +1� 𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝(0, +1) < 0  (7) 
𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝�𝑇𝑇ℎ
𝐿𝐿 , 𝑠𝑠� = 𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺,ℎ�𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿� − (1 − 𝜏𝜏)s𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,ℎ�𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿�  
In the presence of capacity constraints, 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿 (latent trade) will not be observed directly but instead the 
capacity-censored ((1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐾𝐾ℎ > 0 > −𝐾𝐾ℎ) equilibrium with trading volume 𝑇𝑇ℎ∗ 
𝑇𝑇ℎ
∗ = �(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐾𝐾ℎ 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿 > (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐾𝐾ℎ𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒
𝐾𝐾ℎ 𝑇𝑇ℎ
𝐿𝐿 < 𝐾𝐾ℎ  (8) 
Thus, the trade equilibrium with losses and capacity constraints can be determined by solving 
equations (5)-(8) for different loads, cost functions and short term information. 
How well does this model fit to the trade measured in a coupled market environment in 2017? To 
provide a first impression eight equally long half-seasons during the year were considered reflecting 
the seasonal structure of generation capacity that supports high prices with low capacity available in 
low demand summer. For each of these half-seasons a supply curve ((5) and (6)) has been estimated 
with 2017 data (sources in table 3) by nonlinear estimation of exponential supply curves 𝐶𝐶ℎ′(𝐿𝐿) =
𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎ℎ+𝐴𝐴ℎ𝐿𝐿 for France and GB. These supply curves are shown in Figure 5 for France (red) and GB (blue) 
as dashed curves. With these cost functions, 2017 loads and short term information 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿 was 
simulated with (7). 
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Figure 5: Day-ahead electricity prices in 2017 in France (red) and 
GB (blue) dots; 8 estimated half-seasonal supply curves and the 
load distribution without axes labels; average annual load in 
France and GB shown by black dashed lines. 
Figure 6: Day-ahead electricity prices in 2009 in France (red) and 
GB (blue) dots; 8 estimated half-seasonal supply curves and the 
load distribution without axes labels; average annual load in 
France and GB shown by black dashed lines. 
Figure 7 shows the observed trade in 2017 (under coupled markets) against the simulated latent 
trade 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿. The horizontal bands reflect the available transmission capacity, normally 2,000 MW but 
sometimes less.10 The latent trade exceeds the observed trade in 80% of the periods, so that 
censoring is required. The observed unconstrained trade matches the simulated trade perfectly, as 
all data points lie on the identity function. To derive this perfect alignment the loss factor was 
calibrated to 𝜏𝜏 = 0.023. This loss factor will be used throughout the rest of the paper. 
 
Figure 7: Observed trade in 2017 vs simulated trade with calibrated loss factor 𝜏𝜏 = 0.023. 
Figure 8 shows the result of applying the trade model to the uncoupled markets of 2009, although 
the assumption of complete information is inappropriate for that setting. Supply curves for 2009 are 
presented in Figure 6. The simulated latent trade deviates significantly from the observed trade, even 
when capacity constraints are not binding and censoring is unnecessary. To understand this, a model 
of trading between uncoupled markets is developed in the next section. 
                                                          
10 The interconnector with France has two 1,000 MW bipoles, but with four pairs of cables (two pairs damaged during 2016-17) the 
possibility of losing 500 MW increments of capacity should be obvious. 
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Figure 8: 2009 latent trade with losses and observed trade data. Regression curves are going to be explained in section 4.2. 
3.3. Optimal trading between uncoupled markets 
When the markets were not coupled, the French market closed first, forcing traders there to 
anticipate British prices. As traders bid in the French market they commit to delivery, while the 
British market could still respond to late-arriving information, so that its price is uncertain. We treat 
the price difference between the markets as the (normally distributed) return on a risky investment. 
We assume that traders have mean-variance utility,11 maximising a weighted combination of their 
expected return µ and its variance σ2: EU=µ – ½ λσ2. A risk-averse trader with constant absolute risk 
aversion has λ > 0. In a two-asset portfolio consisting of ‘trade’ and a risk- and return-less ‘opt-out’ 
option, the expected return and its variance depend on the trading volume. The trader optimally 
‘diversifies’ as he perceives opt-out as valuable risk limitation and thereby reduces trading. To 
simplify the analysis there is no option to fulfil or cancel a day-ahead commitment through intraday 
trades. 
To determine the expected return and the variance of the portfolio we need the expected British 
price. We assume the trader correctly anticipates short term information such that 𝔼𝔼𝜀𝜀𝐺𝐺,ℎ = 𝜀𝜀𝐺𝐺,ℎ, but 
anticipates load incorrectly as 𝔼𝔼𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺,ℎ = 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺,ℎ + 𝜀𝜀ℎ with 𝜀𝜀ℎ~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎2).12 Furthermore, we assume that 
𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈,ℎ′  is sufficiently linear to use certainty equivalence, so that the expected version of (6) becomes 
𝔼𝔼𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺,ℎ(𝑇𝑇ℎ, 𝜀𝜀ℎ) ≈ 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺,ℎ′ �𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺,ℎ + 𝜀𝜀ℎ − 𝑇𝑇ℎ�+ 𝜀𝜀𝐺𝐺,ℎ (9) 
The anticipation error is therefore also normally distributed and its standard deviation translates to 
the standard error of the value of a sold unit of electricity as 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ �𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺,ℎ�𝜎𝜎. Optimal trade maximises 
the trade/opt-out portfolio with losses: max𝑇𝑇 𝔼𝔼𝑈𝑈ℎ𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝑇𝑇�𝔼𝔼𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺,ℎ − 𝜑𝜑(𝑇𝑇)𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,ℎ� − 𝜆𝜆2 �𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ 𝜎𝜎�2 (10) 
By substituting the British price by its expectation in the optimal trading condition (4) we find optimal 
trading 𝑇𝑇�  under risk aversion (λ > 0): 
                                                          
11 The deviation of the mean-variance representation of the portfolio with normally distributed returns can be found e.g. in Sargent, 1987, 
p. 154. 
12 This can be interpreted as an incorrect estimate of the amount of distributed variable renewable generation that will be subtracted from 
the overall load to give the amount that must be met in the wholesale market. 
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𝑇𝑇��𝔼𝔼𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺,ℎ ,𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,ℎ� =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐾𝐾ℎ (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐾𝐾ℎ ≤ 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃 0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 < (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐾𝐾ℎ0 (1 − 𝜏𝜏)+1 < 𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺,ℎ/𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,ℎ < (1 − 𝜏𝜏)−1
𝜃𝜃 −𝐾𝐾ℎ < 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 0
−𝐾𝐾ℎ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ −𝐾𝐾ℎ
 (11) 
 
𝜃𝜃 = 𝔼𝔼𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺,ℎ − 𝜑𝜑(𝜃𝜃)𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,ℎ
𝜆𝜆�𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ 𝜎𝜎�2  
This is equivalent to equation (4) in the limiting cases of risk neutrality (λ = 0), linear supply curves 
(𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′  = 0) or no uncertainty (σ = 0). If loss-adjusted prices differed in those cases, traders would want 
to send unlimited amounts of electricity to the higher-priced market, but would be constrained by 
transmission capacity. With risk-aversion and uncertainty, traders balance the expected profit from 
additional flows against the impact of a greater loss if the British price makes the trade unprofitable. 
This suppresses trade, although if the expected profit is high enough, trade will increase so that 
capacity limits finally bind. While risk-neutral arbitrageurs eliminate expected price differences until 
they become constrained, figure 6 shows that risk-averse traders reduce trading and price 
equilibration even when they are unconstrained. 
 
Figure 9: The transition from coupled (perfect foresight) to uncoupled market 
equilibrium (risk averse trading). The transition from risk neutrality to risk 
aversion reduces unconstrained trading and price equilibration (𝑝𝑝ℎ is a price 
relation). 
The unconstrained latent equilibrium trade 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿(𝜀𝜀ℎ) can be defined in a similar way to (7) for 𝜆𝜆 ≥ 0 as: 
0 = 𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸�𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿, 𝜀𝜀ℎ� ≔ �𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝�𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿, 𝜀𝜀ℎ ,−1� 𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝(0, 𝜀𝜀ℎ ,−1) > 0𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝(0, 𝜀𝜀ℎ , +1) < 0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝(0, 𝜀𝜀ℎ ,−1)
𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝�𝑇𝑇ℎ
𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿, 𝜀𝜀ℎ , +1� 𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝(0, 𝜀𝜀ℎ , +1) < 0  (12) 
𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝�𝑇𝑇ℎ
𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿, 𝜀𝜀ℎ , 𝑠𝑠� = 𝔼𝔼𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺,ℎ�𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿, 𝜀𝜀ℎ� − (1 − 𝜏𝜏)s𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,ℎ�𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿� − 𝜆𝜆𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿�𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ 𝜎𝜎�2  
Again, due to censoring by the available transmission capacity 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝜀𝜀ℎ) will not be observed directly 
but the censored trade equilibrium 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸∗(𝜀𝜀ℎ) is given by: 
𝑇𝑇ℎ
𝐸𝐸∗(𝜀𝜀ℎ) = �(1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐾𝐾ℎ 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝜀𝜀ℎ) > (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐾𝐾ℎ𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝜀𝜀ℎ) 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒
𝐾𝐾ℎ 𝑇𝑇ℎ
𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝜀𝜀ℎ) < 𝐾𝐾ℎ  (13) 
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The equilibrium trade with anticipation error, losses and capacity constraints can then be determined 
by equations (5), (9) and (12), (13). Note that the coupled market model is a special case of the 
uncoupled market model (12) if λ = 0 or σ = 0. 
4. Application 
Our model implies that the noise clearly present in the trading in Figure 8 is due to anticipation errors 
and that risk aversion should reduce trading. We now use the observed trade data in 2009 to 
determine the parameters 𝜎𝜎 and 𝜆𝜆 that characterise trading in an uncoupled market environment 
before simulating trading in uncoupled markets in 2030. However, the uncoupled market model 
developed so far is not well suited for the estimation of Elecxit costs as the necessary econometric 
quantification of the parameters is impeded by the implicit definition of the trading error. We will 
now 1. develop an approximation of the equilibrium trading level well suited for an econometric 
estimation, 2. estimate the anticipation error parameters and 3. use the estimated parameters to 
simulate Elecxit costs in 2030. 
4.1. Simplification: Disentangling the anticipation error 
To simulate the trading error, latent trade 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝜀𝜀ℎ) can be determined by solving the implicit 
equation (12). This problem is numerically solvable for an equilibrium simulation, but for the 
quantification of the trade error we wish to estimate (13) as standard censored model (TOBIT). This 
requires an exogenous distortion as additive term. Unfortunately, the trading level in (12) depends 
on the anticipation error. Fortunately, the solution of (12) can be approximated by linearisation of 
𝑇𝑇ℎ
𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝜀𝜀ℎ) to disentangle the anticipation error and apply the TOBIT model. For this purpose, we briefly 
assume 𝜏𝜏 = 0 to avoid the no-trading case 0 = 𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸�𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿, 𝜀𝜀ℎ� = 𝔼𝔼𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺,ℎ�𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿, 𝜀𝜀ℎ� − 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹,ℎ�𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿� − 𝜆𝜆𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿�𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ 𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺�2 (14) 
This implicitly defines the trade level depending on the anticipation error 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝜀𝜀ℎ). The implicit 
function theorem then tells us that (for small 𝜀𝜀ℎ and 𝑇𝑇ℎ error) 
𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇ℎ
𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿
𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀ℎ
�
𝜀𝜀ℎ=𝑇𝑇ℎ=0
= 11 + 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹,ℎ′′ �𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹,ℎ�
𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ �𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺,ℎ�
≔ 𝜔𝜔ℎ (15) 
and with respect to risk aversion 𝜆𝜆 (on average to eliminate time dependency besides 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿) 
𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇ℎ
𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿
𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆
�
𝜀𝜀ℎ=𝜆𝜆=0,𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸=𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸 = −𝜎𝜎2𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿2 𝜔𝜔ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ �𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺,ℎ� ≈ −𝜎𝜎2𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿2 1𝐻𝐻� 𝜔𝜔ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ �𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺,ℎ�𝐻𝐻ℎ=1  (16) 
This gives rise to the desired approximation by starting with the undistorted trading level 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿 (still 
based on the correct value of 𝜏𝜏 > 0) and adding the impact of the anticipation error 𝜔𝜔ℎ𝜀𝜀ℎ and risk 
aversion 𝜆𝜆 as 
𝑇𝑇ℎ
𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝜀𝜀ℎ) ≈ 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿 + 𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝜆𝜆 𝜆𝜆 + 𝑑𝑑𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑑𝑑𝜀𝜀ℎ 𝜀𝜀ℎ ≈ 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿 + 𝜔𝜔ℎ𝜀𝜀ℎ (17) 
with 
𝛽𝛽 = 1 − 𝜎𝜎2𝜆𝜆2 1𝐻𝐻� 𝜔𝜔ℎ𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺,ℎ′′ �𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺,ℎ�𝐻𝐻ℎ=1   
(17) is additively separated in the anticipation error and heteroscedastic with known weights 𝜔𝜔ℎ. 
This simplification not only enables the estimation of the model in a linear TOBIT specification (as 
estimation equation and for jumping above capacity thresholds) but it also reveals how differently a 
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load anticipation error transforms into a trading error depending on the difference in the slopes of 
generation marginal costs, driven by the generation structure and risk aversion. Furthermore it 
becomes apparent that risk aversion reduces trade, but only if there is indeed uncertainty. 
Figure 10 (red curve) shows that the amplifier 𝜔𝜔ℎ varies strongly, with a seasonal trend of lower 
values (0.1) during the autumn 2009 and higher values in the summer (0.6) and a high hourly 
variance. It is more difficult to anticipate the optimal trade during the summer than it is during the 
winter even though the load anticipation variance is constant. 
 
Figure 10: Hourly amplifiers (weights) of the load anticipation error to the trade error in 
2009 (red curve) and 2030 (blue curve). The calculation is based on load data and 
estimated supply curves presented in fig. 8 for 2009 and a scenario analysis for 2030 (fig. 
11). 
Optimal censored equilibrium trading 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸∗ then becomes 
𝑇𝑇ℎ
𝐸𝐸∗(𝜀𝜀ℎ) = � (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐾𝐾ℎ 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿 + 𝜔𝜔ℎ𝜀𝜀ℎ > (1 − 𝜏𝜏)𝐾𝐾ℎ𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿 + 𝜔𝜔ℎ𝜀𝜀ℎ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒
𝐾𝐾ℎ 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇ℎ
𝐿𝐿 + 𝜔𝜔ℎ𝜀𝜀ℎ < 𝐾𝐾ℎ  (18) 
Equations (5)-(7) could be used to determine latent trade 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿 and (18) for the distorted censored 
trade with weights defined in (15). 
4.2. Estimating trading distortions in 2009 (uncoupled markets) 
𝛽𝛽 and the distortion parameter 𝜎𝜎 can be estimated as a heteroscedastic censored model. To do so, 
the supply curves estimated at the end of section 3.2 have been used to determine the weights 𝜔𝜔ℎ 
with (15) and in (5)-(7) to simulate latent trade 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐿𝐿 as explanatory variable in (18) for the observed 
censored trade 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝐸𝐸∗(𝜀𝜀ℎ).  A constant α has been added to the threshold in (18) to allow testing for 
asymmetries between export and import. The trading error results from the weighted (𝜔𝜔ℎ) 
anticipation error that makes (18) heteroscedastic. Fortunately, this can be handled with the 
standard TOBIT model by normalising the explanatory variable, regressors and capacity limits with 
the weights13. In this way two TOBIT models for 2009 and 2017 were estimated with LIMDEP 5. The 
TOBIT maximum likelihood estimator relaxes the necessity to minimise the sum of squared residuals 
to the uncensored share of the data only, but the likelihood function is amended by the probability 
                                                          
13 We exploit the fact that theory predicts a specific heteroscedastic structure. In this case, the BLUE of a linear model equals the OLS 
estimator of the homoscedastic linear model with weighted data (Greene, 2007). Equally, the ML estimator of a TOBIT model with ex ante 
known heteroscedastic error structure equals the ML estimator of the homoscedastic TOBIT model with weighted data. This can easily be 
concluded from a comparison of the FOC’s of the according likelihood functions. Each likelihood function depends on standardised 
probability density terms for non-censored data and standardised cumulative terms for censored data. 
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that the censored data indeed exceeds the censoring limits. The latter tends to put upward pressure 
on 𝛽𝛽. 
Because trade and interconnector capacity are reported in different ways (sources in table 3), we 
treated trade observations as censored if they were within 50 MW of the available capacity. The 
model enables us to fully account for the dynamics of the capacity already mentioned in section 3.2. 
The parameter estimates are presented in Table 4. 
Generalised anticipation error model 
 Censored Model 2009 Censored Model 2017 
Observations 8713 8704 
AIC Information Criterion 133087.100 19037.300 
AIC/N 15.275 2.187 
ANOVA fit measure 0.190 11.120 
DECOMP fit measure 0.160 0.490 
Log likelihood function -665400000 -95150000 
 Parameters Standard Error Parameters 
Standard 
Error 
𝛼𝛼� -0.33*** 12.35 4.57*** 0.55 
?̂?𝛽 0.27*** 0.003 0.99*** 0.0005 
𝜎𝜎� 3035.60*** 26.64 67.10*** 0.79 
Table 4: Parameter estimates (*** - 1% level, ** - 5% level) 
The results for the coupled market in 2017 are completely in line with the model of sections 3.1 and 
3.2 – as already expected from figure 7. This can be concluded from the very small 𝛼𝛼� (4.57 MW, 
when trade can be up to 2,000 MW in either direction),14 the almost perfect predictive power of the 
equilibrium trade level for the observed unconstrained trade levels (?̂?𝛽 = 0.99) and the very low 
standard deviation (𝜎𝜎� = 67.1, again in MW). The value of ?̂?𝛽 confirms the absence of any risk and 
related trading reduction. 
Without market coupling in 2009 the constant still had a small (insignificant) value. But the estimate 
of ?̂?𝛽 suggests traders would aim to achieve only 27% of the coupled equilibrium trade level the 
anticipation error has a very large standard error (𝜎𝜎�) of 3035 MW. The regression curve is shown in 
Figure 8. The relative risk aversion of the trader can be determined from (17) with ?̂?𝛽 and 𝜎𝜎� by scaling 
the implicitly estimated absolute risk aversion 𝜆𝜆 with the average hourly trading revenue in 2009. 
The value of 2.61 is reasonable in terms of Ljungqvist & Sargent (2004, p. 426) as it lies in the interval 
[2,3]. It can be concluded that there is a significant risk of losses for traders and in anticipation they 
only take advantage of a small share of the opportunities a risk neutral trader would. We will refer to 
this effect as a trade crunch. 
4.3. Simulation of Elecxit cost in 2030 
We will now estimate the welfare effects of uncoupling the British electricity market from Europe. 
The analysis is based on the scenario ENTSO-E Vision 3 2030 (“National Green Transition”; ENTSO-E, 
2015). The scenario is characterised by high CO2 prices of 71€/tonne and low fuel prices. France 
halves its nuclear generation capacity (-30GW), builds up 60 GW renewables and doubles gas 
(+8GW). GB abandons coal (-16GW) and builds 57 GW renewables. This results in a merit order with 
                                                          
14 Our estimates are statistically significant, though this level of precision is quite common with 8,760 hourly observations per year. 
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gas before coal. Electricity is generated with a high share of renewables while electricity demand 
stagnates at the values of 2020 (details regarding France and Great Britain can be found in Appendix 
2). For the simulation the step cost function of the scenario has been interpolated with an 
exponential function as in the previous section (capacities and marginal costs; figure 11). Load 
profiles and capacities for France and GB were taken from ENTSO-E. The Renewables.ninja dataset 
was used for national average capacity factors of solar PV (Pfenninger and Staffell, 2016) and wind 
(Staffell and Pfenninger, 2016). 
 
Figure 11: Marginal step cost curve of generation technologies from the scenario ENTSO-E Vision 
3 in 2030 in France (red) and GB (blue); load distribution net of intermittent renewables from 
DESSTINEE without axis labels; average annual load in France and GB as black dashed line. 
We simulated generation costs for two-by-two market design and interconnector expansion 
scenarios for Europe and Great Britain in 2030. In the ‘Soft Elecxit’ scenario it is assumed that 
interconnector capacity will be expanded as planned to 10 GW and the day-ahead markets remain 
integrated. Effectively, this is a ‘Business as Usual’ scenario, but against a changing generation and 
demand background. In contrast, in the ‘Hard Elecxit’ Scenario interconnector capacity will expand 
only slightly, to 5 GW (see introduction)15 and the British day-ahead market will be decoupled using 
the Anglo-French market design of 2009. In particular, we assume that the markets close at the same 
times in 2030 as in 2009, which allows us to apply the estimates of the anticipation error based on 
2009 data. We consider two subsidiary interconnector capacity scenarios: 3 GW of interconnection 
as in 2010 and - to estimate the cost of capacity constraints - a purely theoretical case with unlimited 
capacity (the last, rarely used, increments would never be economic). 
A standard normally distributed anticipation error was drawn for every hour of 2030. To simulate the 
trade on uncoupled markets this basic error was scaled with 1. the estimated standard deviation 
(3000) from the previous section, 2. a scaling factor of 2 that reflects the higher share of difficult to 
predict renewable generation in 2030 (method and results in appendix I) and 3. the hourly weights 
𝜔𝜔ℎ that reflect the amplification of the anticipation error to the trading error via the structure of the 
residual load and the generation capacities in 2030. For the latter Figure 10 (blue curve) shows that 
the weights in 2030 on average exceed the weights in 2009. 
                                                          
15 The reduction in transmission capacity expansion is not due to a reduced profitability of the interconnectors, but an assumption that 
builds on higher project costs due to reduced EU venture financing. 
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The anticipation error was then used in (17) to simulate trading in uncoupled markets. To separate 
the impact of the anticipation error and the trade crunch, uncoupling was split into two steps 
(market design and reaction scenarios). Starting from ‘integrated markets’ (𝜎𝜎 = 0, implying 𝛽𝛽 = 1) 
first the anticipation error 𝜎𝜎 = 3000 was introduced and 𝛽𝛽 = 1 was maintained (‘uncertainty’). This 
is equivalent to risk-neutral trading. Then 𝛽𝛽 was lowered to 0.27 reflecting the transition to risk-
averse trading. The latent trade was censored with the fully utilised transmission capacities, which 
depend on our capacity scenario. To reduce the impact of the specific draw of uncertainty, we took 
the average of results from the same 100 (yearly) draws across all scenarios. 
As load is assumed not to react to price changes, country-specific hourly welfare is the sum of 
(negative) generation costs and half of the surplus from trade (we assume this is shared equally 
between the two transmission companies): 
𝑊𝑊𝐺𝐺(𝑇𝑇) = −𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺(𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺 − 𝑇𝑇) − � 1 𝑇𝑇 ≥ 01 − 𝜏𝜏 𝑇𝑇 < 0� 𝑇𝑇 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹(𝜑𝜑(−𝑇𝑇)𝑇𝑇) + 𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺(𝑇𝑇)2  (19) 
𝑊𝑊𝐹𝐹(𝑇𝑇) = −𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹(𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 + 𝜑𝜑(−𝑇𝑇)𝑇𝑇) + � 1 𝑇𝑇 ≥ 01− 𝜏𝜏 𝑇𝑇 < 0� 𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹(𝜑𝜑(−𝑇𝑇)𝑇𝑇) + 𝑝𝑝𝐺𝐺(𝑇𝑇)2  (20) 
Overall welfare is the sum of country-specific welfare. Thus, the welfare effect of market coupling 
can be expressed as the difference in welfare between allocations. 
The results of the simulations are shown in Table 5. Our two most important cases are shaded for 
emphasis. All costs are given relative to their values with integrated markets operating 10 GW of 
interconnector capacity.  This represents pre-referendum expectations for 2030.  As it remains a 
possible outcome of the process to decide the long-term position of the UK, we refer to it as “Soft 
Elecxit”.  We refer to the worst case, with market uncoupling, little transmission expansion and 
reduced trading, as “Hard Elecxit”.  This gives total generation costs which are 1.51% higher than 
with the business as usual “Soft Elecxit”. 
 Trade specification  Interconnector capacity 
Share of 
optimal 
trade 𝜷𝜷 
Anticipation 
error st. dev. 
𝝈𝝈 
 
As in 2017 
3 GW 
Elecxit scenarios 
Theoretical 
Unlimited  5 GW 10 GW 
M
ar
ke
t d
es
ig
n 
an
d 
re
ac
tio
n 
Un
co
up
le
d 
m
ar
ke
ts
 
U2 
Trade 
crunch 
27% 2 × 3000 
GB + F Cost €617m 
Ha
rd
 E
le
cx
it €563m €516m €511m 
%∆ from base 1.66% 1.51% 1.39% 1.37% 
GB Cost €358m €325m €295m €290m 
F Cost €259m €238m €222m €220m 
U1 
Uncert-
ainty 
100% 2 × 3000 
GB + F Cost €444m €290m €75m €25m 
%∆ from base 1.19% 0.78% 0.20% 0.07% 
GB Cost €264m €175m €42m -€2m 
F Cost €180m €114m €33m €27m 
Integrated 
markets (I) 100% 0 
GB + F Cost €418m €248m 0€ 
So
ft 
El
ec
xit
 -€117m 
%∆ from base 1.12% 0.67% 0% -0.31% 
GB Cost €250m €152m 0€ -€81m 
F Cost €168m €96m 0€ €35m 
 Table 5: GB and France annual generation cost in 2030, relative to the Base Case (Soft Elecxit) scenario; the expected 
market value is €37.1Bio. Expectations have been generated as the mean of 100 random draws of the anticipation error in 
each hour of our annual series. 
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Comparing the entries along a row shows the impact of changing transmission capacity, holding 
trading uncertainty constant. With continued market coupling, expanding capacity from 3 GW to 10 
GW would cut generation costs by 1.1% of their predicted 2030 level; further expansion until there 
were no constraints would save an additional 0.3%. Without market coupling, in contrast, expanding 
capacity from 3 GW to 10 GW would only reduce generation costs by 0.3%, and further expansion 
would bring practically no benefit. 
Comparing the entries along a column shows how the cost of generation depends on the level of 
uncertainty facing would-be arbitrageurs. We find that the costs of uncoupling the British market are 
greater the more transmission capacity is available, but that the cost of uncoupling with a trade 
crunch brought about by risk aversion is noticeably higher than the additional cost brought about by 
increasing uncertainty by 2030. 
We infer that when transmission capacity is low, this reduces both the benefits from trades in the 
correct direction and the costs of trades that are based on anticipation errors and the reduction of 
trade. Adding capacity increases the size of potential cost-saving trades, but our calibrated model 
suggests that trading errors will offset these gains. The gross saving per GW of additional capacity 
falls rapidly as capacity is added if markets are uncoupled, even before considering the costs of that 
capacity. If Britain is to give up the most effective mechanism for coordinating cross-border 
electricity trade, we should not invest too much in trying to increase the volume of that trade. Low 
interconnector capacities limit the damage that can result from anticipation errors. 
Splitting the results by country, GB carries 60% of the efficiency losses. This slightly higher share 
results from the higher import dependency of the UK. Generally, figure 10 shows that while residual 
load differs only little between GB and France in 2030, France’s continued use of 37 GW nuclear 
generation means UK prices (frequently) exceed French prices. Therefore, reducing trading 
opportunities tends to force GB to use its more expensive generation and increases GB costs. 
Compared to the Soft Elecxit, a Hard Elecxit scenario would reduce British welfare by over €300m 
while French welfare would fall by over €200m per year. 
5. Conclusion 
To calculate the costs of Great Britain’s possible departure from the EU’s internal electricity market, 
we start by designing a microeconomic model of the decoupled markets between Great Britain and 
France in 2009. Due to different market closing dates in these countries, an early commitment and 
the anticipation of market prices was required to determine interconnector capacity demand. 
Therefore, the demand on the spot markets is not completely common knowledge at the time when 
trades across the interconnector must be decided, and traders must consider the risk of anticipation 
errors. The resulting uncertainty is added to the load as a zero mean, normally distributed 
disturbance, with variance that is a measure of the extent of the trade barrier. While certainty 
equivalence applies to expected profits, it is optimal for risk-averse traders to scale back their desired 
quantities to reduce the variance of their profits. 
In practice, the errors mean that desired trades will be too great or too small, but the effect of these 
errors will be limited by the need to respect interconnector capacity constraints. If the desired trade 
is far greater than the available capacity, then the actual trade would be sub-optimal only if there 
had been a very large error in the information on which it was based. We use a TOBIT regression to 
estimate the level of uncertainty in 2009 between the two uncoupled markets. We find an 
anticipation error equivalent to load mis-forecasting with a standard deviation of 3GW and find 
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strong evidence of risk averse trading. Thus trade ‘crunches’ to 27% of risk neutral trading 
opportunities. 
We adjust these estimates for the greater uncertainty that high penetrations of wind and solar 
generators will induce by 2030 and apply our model to the ENTSO-E Vision 3 scenario for 2030. We 
estimate that a “Hard Elecxit”, with little interconnector expansion and decoupled markets, would 
raise generation costs by €560m per year (1.5% of the common market value), relative to a “Soft 
Elecxit” which retains business as usual, with coupled markets and interconnector capacity rising to 
10 GW. Building more interconnector capacity creates little value if trading arrangements lead to 
substantial trading errors and strongly reduced trading. 60% or €300m of these welfare losses occur 
in Britain. 
Our estimate is based on extrapolating errors in the bilateral trading between France and Great 
Britain from 2009, and scaling these to represent future conditions. In practice, Great Britain already 
has interconnectors to three EU countries (France, Ireland and The Netherlands). More are planned, 
and those in the near-term are still anticipated to go ahead regardless of the Brexit outcome 
(Mathieu et al., 2018). This suggests that a multilateral model might be useful to capture the 
interactions between these, although trading errors would all be driven by the same incorrect 
expectation of British net demand. We plan to use such an approach in future work, which will also 
allow us to focus on the island of Ireland, where the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland currently 
share a joint market. Disruption to that market might be significantly costlier, in proportion to the 
industry’s turnover, than a British Elecxit. 
Our analysis focuses on day-ahead markets only.  An anonymous referee has pointed out that 
forward contracts, either Financial Transmission Rights or matched Contracts for Differences to buy 
power in one country and sell it in the other, might provide the risk hedging needed to increase the 
volume of trade.  The social value and pricing of such contracts deserves further study.  In the short-
term markets, National Grid (2015, table 1) concludes that sharing reserves over interconnectors 
might reduce capacity needs by several GW. Further research should extend our analysis to intraday, 
balancing and reserve markets to further refine our estimates of the possible cost of Elecxit.   
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Appendix I: Variance of the anticipation error 
We have extensively used the anticipation error of residual load 𝜀𝜀ℎ with 𝜀𝜀ℎ~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎2). We now 
provide a background for its variance 𝜎𝜎 that enables a systematic derivation of a scenario dependent 
anticipation error. Residual load in a specific country and hour ℎ, 𝐿𝐿ℎ consists of the load 𝑒𝑒ℎ reduced 
by wind generation 𝐺𝐺ℎ𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑊𝑊 and solar generation 𝐺𝐺ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴 
𝐿𝐿ℎ = 𝑒𝑒ℎ − 𝐺𝐺ℎ𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑊𝑊 − 𝐺𝐺ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴 (a) 
Each component is uncertain, and we assume has an independent normal distribution with a 
standard deviation proportional to its expected level in each period. We break the per-unit 
uncertainty into two, so that the anticipation error for load is equal to 𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆,ℎ𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒ℎ where 𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆,ℎ is a 
standard normal variable and 𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆 is the constant per-unit standard deviation of the anticipation error. 
We use 𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴 and 𝜀𝜀𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑊𝑊 to denote the random components while 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 and 𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤 are the constant per-
unit standard deviations of solar and wind generation, respectively. Under these conditions expected 
residual load can thus be expressed with the residual 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 as (omitting the hour index ℎ): 
𝐿𝐿ℎ + 𝑎𝑎ℎ = 𝑒𝑒ℎ�1 + 𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆,ℎ� − 𝐺𝐺ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴�1 + 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠𝜀𝜀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴,ℎ� − 𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑊𝑊�1 + 𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝜀𝜀𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑊𝑊,ℎ� (b) 
It is straightforward to show that the residual 𝑎𝑎ℎ~𝑁𝑁�0, 𝑒𝑒ℎ𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆 + 𝐺𝐺ℎ𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑊𝑊𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤 + 𝐺𝐺ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠�. In this sense 
we use 𝜎𝜎ℎ = 𝑒𝑒ℎ𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆 + 𝐺𝐺ℎ𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑊𝑊𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤 + 𝐺𝐺ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠. Unfortunately, 𝜎𝜎 depends on the time varying generation 
levels. To simplify the analysis, we approximate with a least squares estimation with 𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆 = 𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙  and 
𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆 = 𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙 to get the static 
𝜎𝜎ℎ ≈ 𝜎𝜎 = 𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆 ∑ �𝑒𝑒ℎ + 𝐺𝐺ℎ𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆 + 𝐺𝐺ℎ𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆�ℎ=1,…,𝐻𝐻 𝐻𝐻 = 𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆 �𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 + 𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺ℎ𝑊𝑊𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑊𝑊 + 𝐺𝐺ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆� (c) 
As we have already estimated the standard deviation of this anticipation error in section 4.2 we do 
not need the absolute value of 𝜎𝜎 but rather the ratio between 2009 and 2030. With the parameters 
in Table A1, we obtain for GB: 
𝜎𝜎2030
𝜎𝜎2009
= 𝑒𝑒2030 + 𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊2030 + 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆2030
𝑒𝑒
2009 + 𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊2009 + 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆2009 ≈ 216 (d) 
The change in generation structure with more renewables will double the anticipation error in 2030 
compared to 2009. 2030 values are the annual averages of load and generation for renewables from 
the scenario in appendix II. 
Parameter GB  2009 Scenario 2030 c) 
Average annual load (GW) 𝑒𝑒 37.1 40.5 
Average annual wind generation (GW) 𝑊𝑊 1.01 18.2 
Average annual solar generation (GW) 𝑆𝑆 0 1.7 
Relative forecasting error wind 𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑆𝑆 4a) 
Relative forecasting error solar 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆  2b) 
Table A1: Model parameters. 
a) Hodge et al (2012). 
b) Lew et al (2013). 
c) Scenario data from appendix II, table A2 
                                                          
16 The value of 2.8 was rounded down to incorporate advances in forecasting accuracy. 
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Appendix II: Parameters of the scenario ENTSO-E Vision 3 – 2030 
 Generation Capacity [GW] Annual generation [GWh] 
 France GB GB France 
 2017 2030 2017 2030 2030 2030 
Gas 6,696 14,051 34,400 36,616 75,370 15,077 
Hard coal 2,930 1,740 16,704 0 22,260 60,092 
Hydro 23,522 27,200 4,360 7,682 0 0 
Nuclear 63,130 37,646 9,361 9,022 61,632 255,886 
Oil  5,300 819  75 0 0 
Other non-RES  5,400  4,110 10,413 12,826 
Solar 378 24,100 2,172 15,560 15,316 30,191 
Wind 1,578 36,600 6,814 51,090 159,785 87,438 
Other RES  4,800 5,964 8,420 39,120 18,123 
Annual demand     354,408 479,198 
Table A2: Assumed generation capacity and mix. RES = Renewable energy sources. Source: 
ENTSO-E, 2015: "TYNDP 2016, Scenario Development Report", European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). Data UK 2017: National Statistics 
Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES): electricity DUKES chapter 5: statistics on electricity 
from generation through to sales. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/electricity-
chapter-5-digest-of-united-kingdom-energy-statistics-dukes. Data France, 2017: RTF. 
 
Nuclear 0.46 €/GJ 
Hard Coal 2.8 €/GJ 
Gas 7.23 €/GJ 
Light oil  13.26 €/GJ 
Heavy oil 9.88 €/GJ 
Oil shale 2.3 €/GJ 
CO2 Price 71 €/tonne 
Table A3: Assumed fuel and carbon 
prices. Fuel quoted against net 
calorific content (lower heating 
value). 
 
